

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 10313 071748Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DOEE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 DODE-00 /026 W
-----050376 071801Z /53

O 071731Z JUL 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1763
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T GENEVA 10313

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: SOVIET DELEGATION VIEWS ON NSS,
DURATION, AND OTHER ISSUES

CTB MESSAGE NO. 258

1. DURING AN INFORMAL CONVERSATION ON JULY 7 BETWEEN
TIMERBAEV AND SLIPCHENKO (USSR), AND NEIDLE AND MCCORMACK
(US), THE FOLLOWING POINTS OF INTEREST EMERGED:

2. NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS (NSS): TIMERBAEV COMMENTED
THAT WE SHOULD NOT DRAW ANY CONCLUSIONS FROM THE DETAILED
QUESTIONS WHICH SOVIET TECHNICAL EXPERTS HAD RECENTLY BEEN
ASKING US EXPERTS IN THE NSS WORKING GROUP. THIS REFLECTED
A DESIRE OF THE SOVIET EXPERTS TO LEARN AS MUCH AS THEY
COULD ABOUT US PROPOSALS AND US EQUIPMENT, BUT SHOULD NOT
BE INTERPRETED AS FORESHADOWING ANY PARTICULAR SOVIET
DECISION ON NSS. THE BASIC POLICY QUESTIONS WERE BEING
REVIEWED IN MOSCOW. (HOWEVER, IN SUBSEQUENT REFERENCES TO
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NSS, TIMERBAEV LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT HE EXPECTED MOSCOW
WOULD ACCEPT AT LEAST SOME NSS. TIMERBAEV'S REMARKS WERE
THUS CONSISTENT WITH A RECENT COMMENT BY SOV DEL CHAIRMAN
PETROSYANTS TO SENATOR CHURCH. RESPONDING TO SENATOR
CHURCH'S REMARKS REGARDING THE IMPORTANCE OF ADEQUATE
VERIFICATION FOR SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE TREATY,
PETROSYANTS SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME NSS IN THE SOVIET

UNION.)

3. RELATION OF NUMBER OF NSS TO DURATION: TIMERBAEV NOTED A REPORT OF COMMENTS BY WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN POWELL ON JULY 5 REGARDING A BOSTON GLOBE STORY BY WILLIAM BEECHER. TIMERBAEV NOTED THAT POWELL HAD SAID "A 3-YEAR BAN IS GENERALLY POSSIBLE." TIMERBAEV BELIEVED THE DURATION OF THE TREATY WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN CONSIDERING OTHER TREATY ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE US HAD FIRST PROPOSED NSS FOR A TREATY OF UNLIMITED DURATION. THEN IT HAD PROPOSED 15 NSS FOR A TREATY OF 5 YEARS DURATION. TIMERBAEV ASSUMED THAT IF THE DURATION WERE SHORTER THAN 5 YEARS IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE TO HAVE A SMALLER NUMBER OF NSS.

4. RELATION OF PNE PROTOCOL TO DURATION: TIMERBAEV SAID THAT THE SOVIET APPROACH TO A PNE PROTOCOL WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED WHATEVER THE DURATION OF THE TREATY. THE SOVIETS WOULD WANT THE PNE PROTOCOL (WHICH WOULD CONTAIN A PROHIBITION ON PNES) TO CALL ALSO FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO SEE IF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCOMMODATION COULD BE WORKED OUT PERMITTING THE CONDUCT OF PNES--WHETHER THE DURATION OF THE WEAPONS BAN WERE "5 YEARS, 3 YEARS OR EVEN ONE YEAR."

5. UK ASSOCIATION WITH THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREE-
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MENT: TIMERBAEV PERSONALLY BELIEVED THAT UK ASSOCIATION SHOULD INVOLVE SOME "MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION" WHICH MIGHT BE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOME NSS IN THE UK OR ITS TERRITORIES. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS HAD NOT REACHED ANY CONCLUSION ON THIS. THE SOVIET DEL WOULD WANT TO TALK OVER WITH THE US DEL WHAT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IN THE UK ONCE THE US AND SOVIET SIDES HAD DETERMINED THE NUMBER OF NSS IN THEIR OWN COUNTRIES. IF THAT WERE A RELATIVELY LARGE NUMBER, THEN IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE TO HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF NSS IN THE UK. IF WE WOUND UP WITH A SMALL NUMBER OF NSS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US, THEN PERHAPS NO NSS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IN THE UK. HOWEVER, THIS WOULD BE CONSIDERED BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND US DELS LATER.

6. SOVIET DEL CONCERN REGARDING ARTICLE I: TIMERBAEV WONDERED IF ARTICLE I (THE BASIC PROHIBITION) WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE REFERRED TO THE POWELL COMMENTS ON THE BEECHER BOSTON GLOBE ARTICLE. HE QUOTED POWELL AS SAYING, WITH REGARD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE US ACCEPTING A LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY, THAT THERE HAD BEEN "NO FINAL DECISION OF THAT NATURE." NEIDLE AGAIN EXPLAINED THAT, BECAUSE US TECHNICAL STUDIES

WERE NOT COMPLETED REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF UNDER-
STANDINGS, THE US DELEGATION PREFERRED TO RETURN TO
ARTICLE I A LITTLE LATER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. JOHNSON

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY, NEGOTIATIONS, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978GENEVA10313
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780279-0564
Format: TEL
From: GENEVA USCTB
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780787/aaaacvco.tel
Line Count: 119
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 7664e779-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 29 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2090792
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: SOVIET DELEGATION VIEWS ON NSS, DURATION, AND OTHER ISSUES CTB MESSAGE NO. 258
TAGS: PARM, US, UK, UR
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/7664e779-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014